This article provides an overview of the developments in 2004 regarding the constitutional freedom of political communication. This will be done through a discussion of the cases of Coleman v Power and Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission. These two cases have confirmed the validity of the general propositions in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, regarding the existence of a freedom of political communication implied from the Australian Constitution, and provide the basis for some observations with respect to that implication. In this article an overview is given of the basic principles in Lange, followed by a detailed discussion of relevant parts of the judgments in Coleman and Mulholland. This article ends with analysis of some of the issues raised by the cases. 
I
LANGE AND SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES
The orthodox starting point for a discussion of the protection of free speech in the Constitution seems to be Lange. 6 Lange followed the decisions of Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth 7 and Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills, 8 in which a majority of the High Court recognised an implied freedom of political communication in the Constitution. Unlike the earlier cases, Lange was a unanimous decision of the High Court. It arose in the circumstances of alleged defamation through the broadcast of a 'Four Corners' television programme by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Lange, the then New Zealand Prime Minister, alleged that the broadcast conveyed imputations that, inter alia, he was unfit to hold public office. The High Court responded by applying the implied freedom, which had been accepted in ACTV and Nationwide News, to the facts and extended the defamation defence of qualified privilege to be consistent with that constitutional imperative. The matter was remitted to the Supreme Court of NSW. Decided in 1997, Lange confirmed that the Constitution, through its text and structure, established a system of representative and responsible government. 9 Due to the constitutional nature of that system, the Constitution therefore also requires that there be freedom of some types of communication, as necessary to maintain that system. That is, the system of government prescribed by the Constitution cannot exist without people having the freedom to communicate on matters governmental and political, or else the people could not inform themselves and each other about potential and actual representatives, nor could the representatives be 'responsible' to the people. The validity of the restriction placed on the freedom, namely the law of defamation, was determined by the often-quoted test adopted in the case:
First, does the law effectively burden freedom of communication about government or political matters either in its terms, operation or effect? Secondly, if the law effectively burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfilment of which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government and the procedure prescribed by s 128 [of the Constitution] for submitting a proposed amendment of the Constitution to the informed decision of the people … If the first question is answered 'yes' and the second is answered 'no', the law is invalid. 10 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 5
This article focuses only on the free speech aspect of the judgments. It does not address all the legal issues arising from the cases. Sections 1, 7, 8, 13, 24, 25, 28 and 30 were referred to as the font of this constitutionallyprescribed system of government: Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557. See also ss 6, 49, 62, 64, 83, 128: Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557-9.
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Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567-8 (footnotes omitted).
Further basic principles were consolidated in Lange. The freedom of communication is negative, in the sense that it is an immunity from government action (including legislative and executive actions and the common law). It is not positive in the sense of a right enforceable directly against people or institutions which burden the freedom. The remedy for any infringement of the freedom is a challenge to the validity of legislation, executive action, or a challenge to the interpretation of the common law. The freedom is not absolute, as it does not protect all forms of communication at all times and in all circumstances.
Although there have been consistent critics of Lange (both judicial 11 and academic 12 ), the Court has not disturbed its basic principles, outlined above, although it has given more consideration to what speech falls within the area of protection, what constitutes a 'burden' on that speech and how the standard of review is to be considered and applied. That exploration will be considered in the context of the Coleman and Mulholland cases. 13 
II COLEMAN Background
Coleman arises from a somewhat more earthy set of facts than Lange. Patrick Coleman has a history of protesting in Townsville, Queensland, with numerous charges against him. On the occasion related to this case he was in Townsville Mall, railing against allegedly corrupt policemen. Coleman was distributing pamphlets with the following words on them:
Ah ha! Constable Brendan Power and his mates, this one was a beauty -sitting outside the mall police beat in protest at an unlawful arrest -with simple placards saying TOWNSVILLE COPS -A GOOD ARGUMENT FOR A BILL OF RIGHTS -AND DEAR MAYOR -BITE ME -AND TOWNSVILLE CITY COUNCIL THE ENEMY OF FREE SPEECH -the person was saying nothing just sitting there talking to an old lady then BAMMM arrested dragged inside and detained. Of course not happy with the kill, the cops -in eloquent prose having sung in unison in their statements that the person was running through the mall like a madman belting people over the head with a flag pole before the dirty hippie bastard assaulted and [sic] old lady and tried to trip her up with the flag while ... while ... he was having a conversation with her before the cops scared 16 of distributing material with insulting words (s 7A(1)(c)) and using insulting words in public (s 7(1)(d)). Due to the violent circumstances surrounding Coleman's arrest, he was also charged with obstructing police, serious assault against police and wilful damage.
At trial, Coleman was found guilty of all charges except that of wilful damage. Coleman unsuccessfully appealed to the District Court. In the Queensland Court of Appeal, Coleman was successful only in relation to the charge arising from the distribution of printed material containing insulting words, through a decision that s7A(1)(c) was invalid as it infringed the implied freedom of political communication established in Lange. 17 Coleman, self-represented, was then granted special leave to appeal the remaining charges of using insulting words, obstructing police and assaulting police, in the High Court. A majority (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ) allowed the appeal in relation to the charge of using insulting words. All of the Court except McHugh J dismissed the appeal regarding the remaining charges that arose from the circumstances of Coleman's arrest.
Therefore, although in the end Coleman was not guilty of either of the charges relating to his communications made in the Townsville Mall (including the one being challenged before the High Court), he was penalised for the way he reacted to his arrest made as a result of those communications. The decision with respect to the consequential charges will be outlined before returning to focus on the primary issue for the purpose of this article -the application of the Lange test to the insulting words legislation.
The appellant had argued that the arrest was unlawful because the insulting words charge (which prompted the purported arrest) was based on invalid legislation. Therefore, the appellant's actions in resisting the police attempts to restrain and arrest him (which actions constituted the basis for the remaining charges) were justified, so the charges of obstructing police and assaulting police should also be dismissed. The relevant law at the focus of this argument was with respect to police powers of arrest, namely, s 35(1) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 1997 (Qld). It relevantly provided: 'It is lawful for a police officer … to arrest a person the police officer reasonably suspects has committed or is committing an offence'. McHugh See Coleman v P [2002] 2 Qd R 620. ____________________________________________________________________________________ that s 7(1)(d) of the Vagrants Act was invalid, that therefore the police could not have had 'a reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed' 18 so the arrest was unlawful and the remaining charges had to be dismissed. In contrast, a majority of the Court concluded that the Vagrants Act was valid (albeit more limited in operation than the police had assumed, to the extent that Coleman's activities did not fall within it) and therefore the issue of the powers of arrest did not arise, 19 and the other charges remained.
Prohibition on using insulting words in public
The focus of this analysis of Coleman is the application of the Lange test to the primary legislation in the case -s 7(1)(d) of the Vagrants Act. However, a significant caveat in this discussion is that concessions were made by the parties to the effect that Lange was valid, that it applied to the case and that the first limb of the Lange test (that the law burdened the freedom) was satisfied on the facts. 20 The Court accepted these concessions and made it clear that they did not decide the issues conceded, 21 although some of the judges agreed with the concessions. 22 There was a diversity of views as to the legitimacy of making such concessions. McHugh J stated that parties can legitimately concede issues before the Court, 23 while Kirby J disagreed, but noted that the concessions made no difference to his conclusion as he found them to be correct. 24 Despite the position of the parties, all the justices addressed the Lange issue. Although some of that discussion may be obiter, it nevertheless provides an indication of the thinking of the current Court.
McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ all read down the legislation to such an extent that it did not apply to Coleman's activities. Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ restricted its application to circumstances where the words were 'either intended to provoke unlawful physical retaliation, or were reasonably likely to do so'. 25 The justices applied a process of statutory interpretation informed by the Constitution. McHugh J came to the same ultimate conclusion that the legislation did not apply to Coleman, but by a different route. McHugh J found the legislation was invalid by virtue of the application of the Lange test, that the end to be achieved by the legislation was legitimate but that the means by which it was to be achieved were not. That is, that an unqualified prohibition against insulting language was not justified. 26 His Honour found the legislation invalid 'to the extent that it penalised insulting words uttered in discussing or raising matters concerning politics and government in or near public ' The offence which it creates restricts freedom of speech. That freedom is not, and never has been, absolute. But in confining the limits of the freedom, a legislature must mark the boundary it sets with clarity. Fundamental common law rights are not to be eroded or curtailed save by clear words.' Seemingly as a separate argument, Kirby J also considered a separate notion of 'ordinary civil rights to free expression': at 237-8 [225], 245 [250] . He outlined the rule as follows: 'In order to be effective, a statutory provision diminishing ordinary civil rights to free expression, otherwise recognised by the common law, must be stated clearly. … General words … will not normally suffice' (footnote omitted). Kirby J also stated: 'Because of the common law rule that "everybody is free to do anything, subject only to the provisions of the law", there is a general freedom of speech under the common law in so far as it has not been lawfully restricted': at 246 [253] (footnote omitted). He added force to this argument as follows: 'Even more clearly will this approach govern the interpretation where the common law right in question is protected by an implied constitutional freedom, such as that expressed in The justices wavered between the terms 'right' and 'freedom'. Nevertheless, this discussion of the common law's protection of speech suggests that there may be a common law 'right' to free speech, distinct from the notion of a general 'freedom' of speech derived from 'the common law rule that "everybody is free to do anything, subject only to the provisions of the law"'. 32 This focus on interpretation does not preclude the case being seen as a significant one with respect to free speech in the Constitution. All the justices address the Lange test in some form, either as a reason to affirm their interpretation of the meaning of the legislation, 33 in the context of a principle of interpretation where 'in the event of ambiguity, a construction of legislation should be preferred which avoids incompatibility with the Constitution', 34 or in order to address the validity of the legislation. However, it remains significant that statutory interpretation was at the core of the judgments. This is consistent with the trend of the Court to avoid directly addressing constitutional issues if an alternative resolution can be found, while at the same time acknowledging the 'single system of jurisprudence' 35 in Australia, whereby the Constitution has an affect on legislation and the common law. These cases provide yet another example of the symbiotic relationship between the Constitution and other forms of law in Australia. 36 What follows is an outline of how the Court addressed aspects of the implied freedom in Coleman, namely, the scope of the freedom, its application to State legislation and the standard of review to be applied.
Scope of the freedom -insults and police officers
The insulting nature of Coleman's communications and their subject matter (State police officers) led to a discussion of whether such communication could be covered by the freedom.
A majority 37 concluded that insults could constitute political communication. McHugh J stated that '[t]he concession that the words used by the appellant were a communication on political or government matters was also correctly made. … Insults are as much a part of communications concerning political and government matters as _____________________________________________________________________________________ 31 The first is that 'a construction that would arguably diminish fundamental human rights (including as such rights are expressed in international law) should not normally be preferred if an alternative construction is equally available that involves no such The Chief Justice (in the minority in relation to the primary charge) did not explicitly address the issue but stated: 'Let it be accepted that his conduct was, in the broadest sense, "political"', going on to note the problem of delimiting the scope of 'political' communication: Coleman (2004) determined on the basis of the concession that the legislation burdened the freedom but that this issue returned, albeit 'in another guise' when addressing the second stage of the Lange test. 50 At first Heydon J seemed to accept that 'some communications on government and political matters are insulting' 51 and that the legislation may burden the freedom, although any such burden would be 'very slight'. 52 However, he went on to suggest that insulting words are detrimental 'to the exchange of useful communications', 53 characterised such words as neither information, opinions nor argument relevant to political communication and concluded that '[t]o address insulting words to persons in a public place is conduct sufficiently alien to the virtues of free and informed debate on which the constitutional freedom rests that it falls outside of it.' 54 The subject of Coleman's insulting words was the activities of certain Queensland police officers. A majority concluded that discussion of the behaviour of such officers could constitute relevant communication for the purpose of the implied freedom. McHugh J stated that the freedom includes discussion regarding the Executive, in this case including the State police force. 55 Gummow and Hayne JJ stated that:
Given the extent to which law enforcement and policing in Australia depends both practically, and structurally … upon close cooperation of federal, state and territory police forces, there is evident strength in the proposition that an allegation that a state police officer is corrupt might concern a government or political matter that affects the people of Australia. 56 Kirby J took a similar approach, considering that financial dependence and integration as mentioned in Lange, 'even communications that principally, or substantially, concern state governmental or political issues (such as the alleged corruption of state police)' could constitute relevant communications. 57 The Chief Justice, Callinan J and Heydon J 58 did not address this issue.
The freedom affecting State legislation
A threshold issue of whether State legislation is subject to the implied freedom was conceded by the parties. McHugh J supported that concession 59 on the basis that the States' powers had been withdrawn by ss 106 and 107 of the Constitution, not only with respect to powers explicitly given to the Commonwealth as exclusive powers, but also in relation to: powers which would entrench on the zone of immunity conferred by … the implied freedom of communication on political and governmental matters. … The constitutional immunity is the leading provision; the sections conferring powers on the federal, state and territory legislatures are subordinate provisions that must give way to the constitutional immunity. To the extent that the exercise of legislative or executive powers, _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Volume 33 ____________________________________________________________________________________ conferred or saved by the Constitution, interferes with the effective operation of the freedom, the exercise of those powers is invalid. 60 Gummow and Hayne JJ agreed 61 and Kirby J seems implicitly to have accepted that State legislation is vulnerable to the Lange implication. 62 The Chief Justice and Heydon J took a more neutral approach. 63 Callinan J did not address this issue. Instead he seems to have focused on a requirement that a burden on the freedom must be in relation to 'federal institutions, elections or referenda', 64 which he stated was not satisfied on the facts.
The standard of review
In Coleman, there was a great deal of discussion with respect to the standard of review to be applied in determining when a law infringed the freedom. In general, the Lange test seems to have survived, but with a slight textual amendment. The debate between whether to adopt the phrase 'reasonably appropriate and adapted' or a test of 'proportionality' continued and the two-tiered test from earlier cases was adopted by some members of the Court.
A majority showed support for a slight rewording of the second stage of the Lange test. That rewording is to the effect that it becomes:
is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government. 65 This change from 'the fulfilment of which' to 'in a manner which' seems merely to confirm that the test includes a consideration of the means by which a legislative policy is put into effect, which could be found in the previous incarnation in any event. Perhaps more telling is the rejection, by the same majority, of the submission of the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth and New South Wales that the second stage of the Lange test 'should be weakened by requiring only that the law in question be "reasonably capable of being seen as appropriate and adapted."' 66 This suggests that the Court is asserting its supervisory role over governmental action which may infringe the freedom.
In addition to the slight rewording of the Lange test, Gleeson CJ and Heydon J (both in the minority) seem to have supported a standard of review that requires different levels of scrutiny of the law in question, depending on whether the restriction of relevant communication is merely an incidental effect of the law or the purpose of the law. This two-tiered approach harks back to the earlier free speech cases such as 67 Even after the unanimous decision in Lange, Gaudron J maintained the distinction between the two types of laws in Kruger 68 and Levy. 69 Gleeson CJ agreed with that approach, to the extent that he agreed with the standard of scrutiny as it applies to laws which only incidentally restrict political communication. 70 Heydon J agreed that where the impugned law is related to a subject other than the restriction of political communication and its effect on such communication 'is unrelated to their nature as political communications', 71 it is easier to justify than 'a law that directly restricts or burdens a characteristic of the constitutional freedom.' 72 In adding to this distinction between content-specific prohibitions and incidental prohibitions, Heydon J supported statements in earlier cases that 'a law curtailing political discussion may be valid if it operates in an area in which discussion has traditionally been curtailed in the public interest, or as part of the general law.' 73 In contrast to the preference of other justices, McHugh J rejected the need to give the freedom special weight in certain circumstances, focusing instead on the general notion of compatibility:
The question is … whether the federal, state or territory power is so framed that it impairs or tends to impair the effective operation of the constitutional system ... by impermissibly burdening communications on political or governmental matters. In all but exceptional cases, a law will not burden such communications unless, by its operation or practical effect, it directly and not remotely restricts or limits the content of those communications or the time, place, manner or conditions of their occurrence. And a law will not impermissibly burden those communications unless its object and the manner of achieving it is incompatible with the maintenance of the system of representative and responsible government established by the Constitution. 74 The notion of compatibility is a convenient link to the broader issue of the formula to be adopted with respect to the standard of review -whether 'reasonably appropriate and adapted' or 'proportionality' 74 is to be preferred. In Coleman the parties conceded that Lange is the applicable law, and the 'argument … proceeded upon the common assumption that … a test of "reasonably appropriate and adapted" 
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McHugh J engaged in a sustained discussion of the standard of review to be applied in relation to the implied freedom but seems to have concluded that the Lange test stands. 76 This seems to have occurred in the context of McHugh J confirming his general views with respect to the nature of the freedom and in response to Stone's criticisms. 77 Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ seem to have impliedly accepted the 'reasonably appropriate and adapted' standard, 78 Heydon J adding that this does not call for a conclusion that 'the law is the sole or best means of achieving that end.' 79 Callinan J proposed an alternative phrase: 'is the law a reasonable implementation of a legitimate object', 80 although this does not seem different in substance. In contrast, Kirby J was very critical of the phrase 'reasonably appropriate and adapted', preferring the notion of 'proportionality'. 81 The main reason for this seems to be an aversion to the term 'appropriate', which may suggest that the Court is imposing its view of the merits of the impugned legislation beyond the more limited exercise of determining the validity of the law. 82 All the justices analysed some kind of 'fit' between the impugned law and the maintenance of the constitutional system at issue. However, the formulation of that test is no longer unanimous. In the end, perhaps this is inconsequential, as the decision will always be a matter of judgment, regardless of how the test of compatibility is framed.
Coleman provided the Court with an opportunity to delve into the Lange test. Unfortunately, the concession made by the parties and the statutory interpretation route taken by some of the members of the Court prevented authoritative development of the Lange principles. Nevertheless, the case gives rise to some interesting discussion with respect to the scope of the freedom.
III MULHOLLAND Background
The case of Mulholland concerned the validity of Commonwealth electoral legislation. It is a case where the Court was unanimous in the ultimate conclusion but six separate judgments were published. Mulholland, the registered officer of the Democratic Labor Party ('DLP'), challenged the validity of aspects of Part XI of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth). 83 The relevant sections create a system of registration of political parties, with consequential benefits including having the party name placed 'above the line' on Senate ballot papers, advantages with respect to electoral funding and access to relevant electronic electoral rolls. 84 The legislation also creates limitations on that registration. There were two specific limitations at the heart of Mulholland's challenge -the '500 rule' and the 'no-overlap' rule. The 500 rule requires a political party to have a minimum of 500 members in order to be a registered party, if the party does not have a representative in Parliament. Parties could be required to provide that list of members to the Australian Electoral Commission. The no-overlap rule was a requirement that no member could be a concurrent member of any other registered political party. The Australian Electoral Commission had requested the list of members from the DLP, which Mulholland, as the registered officer, refused to provide (presumably because the DLP did not have sufficient members to satisfy the registration requirements). In circumstances where a federal election was imminent, Mulholland challenged the legislation, presumably to protect the DLP's place on ballot papers. Parts of the Act were challenged on a number of grounds, including that: the legislation was not supported by a legislative head of power; the legislation contravened ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution by imposing unreasonable discrimination on some political parties and not allowing a 'direct' choice by the people; and the legislation infringed a purported constitutional freedom of association for political purposes and a right of privacy in relation to such an association. Mulholland is therefore a case that touches on many areas of constitutional law. However, this article addresses only the remaining issue -the implied freedom of political communication argument.
Mulholland argued that the restrictions imposed by the 500 rule and the no-overlap rule burdened the constitutional freedom of communication by restricting which parties could be registered and therefore be able to have their candidates' party affiliation appear 'above the line' on Senate ballot papers. Mulholland's application failed in the Federal Court, before the Full Court of that Court, and in the High Court. Unlike Coleman, no broad concession was made in Mulholland with respect to the operation of the Lange test to the facts. In addressing the implied freedom argument, the Court's discussion is relevant to the scope of the freedom, the standard of review and the notion of burden.
Scope of the freedom -the ballot paper
In Mulholland, the communication at issue was the identification of a candidate with their political party 'above the line' on Senate ballot papers. The Chief Justice concluded that such party affiliation is, in a 'substantial, practical sense' a communication for the benefit of candidates. 85 He looked to the importance of political parties in the practice of government in Australia and concluded that:
It is proper, and realistic, to regard the information conveyed to electors by the [ opposition to the phrase 'reasonably capable of being regarded by the Parliament as appropriate and adapted', which was urged by the respondents. 97 The idea of a twotiered standard of review, whereby a different degree of scrutiny is applied depending on the purpose of the law in question, was approved of by the Chief Justice. 98 Kirby J questioned whether such a distinction is helpful, but stated:
it is probably true to say that, in certain circumstances [including when the power is directed against unpopular minorities or where lawmakers pursue their own partisan advantage], courts have a heightened vigilance towards the potential abuse of the lawmaking power inimical to the rule of law. … This is the result of applying a constitutional standard that assumes no preference for incumbents or any other particular political interest and postulates (at least in general terms) a 'level playing field' for competing candidates and political parties offering their ideas, policies and programmes to the electors. 99 The Chief Justice discussed the meanings of 'proportionality' and 'reasonably appropriate and adapted', concluding that he had 'no objection' to the use of either term, 100 while Kirby J maintained his criticism of the latter phrase. 101 Kirby J continued his search for 'an explanation of constitutional connection that is clearer and more informative' than the variations of 'reasonably appropriate and adapted', 102 focusing on 'considerations of substance rather than form' and stating that he is influenced by 'universal human rights as they express democratic ideals'. 103 Kirby J reiterated his preference for a test of 'proportionality', applying it in the context of both characterisation and limitations on legislative power. 104
What does it mean to burden the freedom?
A majority 105 concluded that Mulholland had failed the first limb of the Lange test by failing to convince the Court that the legislation burdened the freedom. The essence of their reasoning focused on their finding that he had not established a pre-existing right to communicate which was burdened by the impugned legislation.
McHugh J argued that as there is no independent right of communication through a ballot paper, apart from the legislative entitlement under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), which has connected to it the inherent restrictions (namely the 500 rule and no-overlap rule), the legislation does not burden the communication. 106 The crux of this argument seems to be that the restriction must be divorced from the law that creates the right of communication: 'Proof of a burden on the implied constitutional freedom requires proof that the challenged law burdens a freedom that exists independently of that law.' 107 Gummow and Hayne JJ found that no 'common law _____________________________________________________________________________________ 97 
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Volume 33 ____________________________________________________________________________________ right' exists granting the DLP a right to have their name on the ballot paper. 108 Therefore, considering the 'existence and nature of the "freedom" asserted by the appellant … it is unnecessary to take any further the matters which arise under Lange.' 109 Callinan J addressed this issue in a slightly different way. He focused on the specific idea that the appellant had to identify a constitutional right to have his party affiliation included on the ballot paper. ... As the appellant has no relevant right to the imposition of an obligation upon another, to communicate a particular matter, he has no right which is capable of being burdened. The appellant is seeking a privilege, not to vindicate or avail himself of a right. 110 Heydon J generally agreed with this analysis. He stated that there is no burden because there is no 'relevant "right or privilege … under the general law" to be interfered with.' 111 The appellant had conceded that a prohibition on any party affiliations being placed on ballot papers would be valid and therefore '[i]t follows that to legislate for a mixture of permissions and prohibitions, so as to permit the party affiliations of some candidates but not others to appear on the ballot paper, cannot interfere with the implied freedom.' Heydon J stated that it would be 'paradoxical' if a complete prohibition were valid but a partial one invalid and if an implied freedom created an obligation to publicise. 112 This raises the question of what 'rights' will satisfy the requirement. The appellant raised the case of ACTV in support of its argument that the freedom was burdened by the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth). ACTV concerned a challenge to the validity of Part IIID of the Political Broadcasters and Political Disclosures Act 1991 (Cth), which prohibited political advertising during election periods 113 unless regulations were made to allow certain restricted advertising. 114 A majority in that case held that Part IIID of the Act was invalid because it infringed the constitutional freedom of political discussion. The analogy sought to be drawn between ACTV and Mulholland was rejected by McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ. Their reasons for doing so shed some light on the pre-existing right argument.
McHugh J found that in ACTV the Act burdened prior statutory rights to broadcast which existed under the Broadcasting Act 1942 (Cth) and Radiocommunications Act 1983 (Cth), that '[t]he [Act] operated to burden long-existing rights that existed independently of that Act. The case is not a relevant analogue with the present case.' 115 Gummow and Hayne JJ also found the reliance on ACTV was 'misplaced' because the Act in that case 'restricted what otherwise was the freedom under the common law to transmit broadcasting and television programmes to the general public and to erect, maintain and use the necessary equipment'. 116 the relevant restriction in ACTV, namely, the 'broadcasters' freedom to broadcast', 117 rather than any general freedom 'enjoyed by citizens to discuss public and political affairs and to criticise federal institutions' mentioned by Mason CJ in ACTV. 118 Heydon J also found there to be 'no analogy' between the legislation in ACTV and that in Mulholland because the legislation in ACTV was: a prohibition on a traditional category of political communications being conducted through ordinarily available media. It thus burdened an ordinary mode of communication in such a way as seriously to impede discussion about elections. This is quite distinct from the enactment of a statutory scheme regulating the content of the official ballot paper. 119 In contrast to the other justices, Kirby J questioned the dichotomy between the 'freedom of communication' and an 'obligation to publicise'. 120 He disagreed with the analysis of Gummow and Hayne JJ regarding the distinction, 121 arguing instead that what was being sought by Mulholland was the invalidation of legislation which contravened the 'constitutional prescription', not the granting of special benefits. 122 With respect to the issue of a pre-existing right, Kirby J stated that the approach of the majority, if taken to extremes, could 'effectively neuter the implied freedom of communication … The common law adapts to the Constitution. Where necessary, the common law would, in my opinion, afford remedies designed to uphold such an important constitutional protection.' 123 In Mulholland, the Court addressed many issues relevant to constitutional law. With respect to the implied freedom of political communication, the Court confirmed the principles in Lange. Significantly, it forestalled analysis of the second limb of the Lange test through its interpretation of what constitutes a relevant burden.
IV SOME COMMENTARY
This section provides some commentary on the two cases of Coleman and Mulholland. The issues discussed are the institutional focus of the implication, the way in which the justices have approached the task of determining what is relevant to the operation of the constitutionally-prescribed system of government, and the requirement of a preexisting right to communicate before a relevant burden on the freedom can exist.
Institutional focus and judicial review
Coleman (albeit through a concession regarding the application of Lange) and Mulholland have confirmed that the implied freedom of communication has an institutional focus and foundation. By this I mean that the implied freedom exists in order to ensure the effective operation of constitutional structures, rather than because of an explicit concern for individuals' rights or freedoms -these are merely inevitable by-products of the Lange implication. In Coleman, the institutional focus was described thus by 
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If the system is to operate effectively, however, of necessity it must be free from laws whose burdens interfere or have a tendency to interfere with its effectiveness. Thus, it is a necessary implication of the system that no legislature or government within the federation can act in a way that interferes with the effective operation of that system. But since the implication arises by necessity, it has effect only to the extent that it is necessary to effectively maintain the system of representative and responsible government that gives rise to it. 124 The questions which will therefore lie underneath any case concerning the implication are: 'what is the system' and what is 'necessary' to ensure the effective maintenance of that system? Further, a significant issue in this area of law is how the Court answers those questions. A couple of preliminary observations can be made here with respect to the Court's reasoning in Coleman and Mulholland. The Court has confirmed that the institution to be protected is the system of representative and responsible government established by the Constitution. In Mulholland, the Court went into some detail regarding the system of government established by the Constitution, due to the other arguments raised in the case. 125 In doing so, the consistent message was that the Parliament has significant power to determine the detail of the political systems and institutions in place as part of representative and responsible government. The phrase 'until the Parliament otherwise provides' throughout the Constitution confirms this approach, as well as the lack of specific references to the system of government in the text.
This power of the Parliament affects the role of the Court in adjudicating with respect to the system of government. However, none of the justices challenged the ability of the Court to exercise some kind of supervisory role over governmental action. In Mulholland the Court acknowledged that there are 'certain fundamental requirements' 126 or 'an irreducible minimum content' 127 of the system against which they will judge governmental action. These requirements were not fully explained.
In relation to the exercise of the Court's supervisory role, a focus on the text of the Constitution has been confirmed, with McHugh J being the most vocal member of the Court in this regard. In both Coleman and Mulholland McHugh J maintained his position that the text and structure of the Constitution is the font of the freedom and that no resort should be made to 'political or other theories external to the Constitution.' 128 It seems almost axiomatic that any act of interpretation must involve some kind of theory, if only a theory of interpretation itself. This is acknowledged by McHugh J. 129 Most of the judges seem to have accepted the two-stage approach of the Lange test. First, determine whether the law burdens the freedom and in doing so, address what is relevantly 'political' in a constitutional sense to determine the coverage of the freedom. Then, address whether the burden is justified by considering what is 'necessary' for the constitutional system of government to determine the amount of protection granted by the freedom. However, as noted below, 134 any clear separation between the two may be collapsing in the analysis of some members of the Court.
At both stages of this analysis the justices have revealed what they consider to be important elements of the constitutional system of government. Some members of the Court focused on the reality of politics and others emphasise what they believe the political system should look like. In Mulholland, Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Kirby JJ referred to the importance of political parties in Australian political practice in order to conclude that party affiliation on ballot papers is relevant communication and
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Volume 33 ____________________________________________________________________________________ therefore covered by the freedom. 135 Considering the rationale of the freedom, these references could be taken to mean that those justices assume the constitutional legitimacy of political parties within that system. The freedom covers communication that is relevantly political in a constitutional sense, that is, connected to the system of representative and responsible government. If political party affiliation is included in its scope, political parties must be a legitimate part of the system. By the members of the Court relying on 'reality' to support this argument, the status quo is seen to be a relevant touchstone of what is constitutional government.
By contrast, in Coleman, Callinan and Heydon JJ reached their ultimate conclusion by focusing on the civility of discourse as an important part of political debate. In this instance, these justices painted a picture of the system of government as they believe it should exist, or as they believe it would most effectively operate, and use that ideal as the measure for what communication will be protected by the freedom. Callinan J seems to have argued that insulting language is not relevantly political. Heydon J did not do so explicitly, but hinted in that direction. Whether these justices limit the freedom's operation on the basis of coverage or protection, they both appear to be incorporating an aspiration for reasonable, civil communication within the constitutional system of government.
Critiquing the pre-existing right argument
In my view, the reasoning in Mulholland with respect to the need for a pre-existing right to communicate before a law will relevantly burden the freedom of political communication raises the most significant issues with respect to the 'existence and nature of the "freedom"'. 136 In Mulholland, a majority avoided addressing the second limb of the Lange test by concluding that, as Mulholland did not identify a right for the DLP to have its name above the line on the Senate ballot paper that existed independently of the Act which contained the impugned restrictions on such publication, there was no burden on the freedom.
The consequence of this argument is that Parliament has the power to create limited rights of communication, which, if connected to the restrictions to the extent that the right and the restrictions exist in one piece of legislation, can never be considered as limitations on freedom of political communication. Seemingly, Parliament can avoid the implication by only granting limited rights, because the argument turns on whether the right and the impugned limitations are contained within the same Act.
This approach seems to elevate form over substance rather than assessing the impact of the restriction on the system of constitutional government, which is at the heart of the implication. By forestalling the analysis at this threshold, on the basis that no separate right was identified, it is conceivable that the system may be detrimentally affected without the ability of the courts to protect it. Consider the following extreme hypothetical example. In the future, the predominant form of communication regarding political issues prior to elections becomes internet chat sites. The government somehow controls access to all chat sites. It allows communication through those chat sites by requiring users to obtain a licence under the Chat Sites Act _____________________________________________________________________________________ 135 However, it should be remembered that they concluded that it is not protected in the circumstances because the legislation restricting the communication satisfies the second stage of the Lange test. 2030 (Cth). The licence fee is $100,000. As that restriction is established within the Act that provides the right to communicate on the chat sites, the implied freedom is not burdened unless a separate right to communicate is found outside the Act. Following the logic of the reasoning in Mulholland, this holds true regardless of the practical detrimental effect on political communication prior to federal elections. This is because the 'threshold' is not passed, so the second limb of the Lange test, that of compatibility between the restriction and the system of government, is not reached.
Another issue to explore with respect to this part of the reasoning in Mulholland is what kind of legal rule qualifies as a ' pre-existing right'. A variety of terms are used by members of the Court: 'freedom', 'common law right', 'constitutional right or right to the imposition of an obligation upon another', 'right or privilege … under the general law'. 137 It is not clear whether the judges mean different things. It also produces an interesting comparison with Coleman, where there appeared to be a consensus as to the existence of a common law right or freedom with respect to free speech. This was not referred to in Mulholland, perhaps because the argument took place and orders were made in that case prior to the judgment in Coleman. 138 It may be argued that if there is a fundamental right of free speech at common law (as is suggested at least by some of the Court in Coleman), this could constitute a relevant 'pre-existing right'. If not, is that because the common law rules are not truly characterised as rights, or because the prerequisite right must be quite specific, to allow the particular form or content of communication that is burdened by the challenged law?
The division between Kirby J and most of the other justices on the basis of this preexisting right argument seems to reflect a broader disagreement with respect to what constitutes a relevant burden and what 'freedom' means in this context. The difference can be characterised as a distinction between a 'pure' burden and a 'relevant' burden. The majority on this point seem to be aligned with McHugh J's analysis, that the 'freedom' at issue does not mean an absolute freedom from all regulation or restraint, but a freedom from a relevant type of burden. This conclusion is reached by defining some regulation as beneficial for the operation of the system of government and therefore not a relevant burden. 139 In contrast, Kirby J took a more absolute view. If communication is burdened in any way, that restriction is a relevant burden, with the legitimacy of that burden being a separate issue. 140 The distinction between the two approaches suggests that the majority have, to some extent, collapsed the two stages in _____________________________________________________________________________________ 137 The combination of these phrases brings to mind Hohfeld's analysis of legal rights as set out by Waldron in Jeremy Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (1984) 6-7. Waldron outlines the way in which Hohfeld characterised legal rights as privileges, claim rights, powers and immunities, with each label bearing a different meaning. 138 
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Volume 33 ____________________________________________________________________________________ the Lange test by incorporating an evaluation of compatibility with the system of government in determining the character of any alleged 'burden', rather than addressing whether the freedom is burdened and the legitimacy of that burden as sequential and separate questions. 141
V CONCLUSION
Coleman and Mulholland are the latest additions to the developing law of implied free speech under the Constitution. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they provide neither a unanimous position, nor a clarification of all aspects of this area of law. What they do provide is a glimpse of the attitudes of the Court as at 2004 and confirmation of some of the basics of the Lange principles. It remains the case that the implied freedom of political communication is not a free-standing boundless freedom of speech, enforceable by all to protect general speech, but is a limited immunity from some government action. By contrast, in Coleman, the Court identified a very broad 'fundamental' common law right or freedom of speech. The constitutional freedom is intrinsically connected only to that which is determined to be necessary for the maintenance of the constitutional institutions known as representative and responsible government. Individual rights are not the focus of the implied freedom, yet the Court must consider specific factual circumstances of individuals in order to determine the implied freedom cases brought before the Court. In determining what is necessary for the maintenance of the constitutional system of government, different methods of analysis and different versions of what that system contains are vying for ascendancy. On the one hand, some justices are concerned with civility and the effective operation of a system that fits an ideal. On the other, some justices seem to be trying to protect what they perceive to be the status quo by emphasising the practice or reality of politics in Australia. Neither approach is without its faults. No clear standard of review emerges other than what could be called a collection of approaches that all look to whether there is a 'fit' between the law and a legitimate objective.
These cases show the Court to be eager to avoid the constitutional issue, or at least avoid a full analysis of the Lange test. In Coleman, the Court made statutory interpretation the primary legal act, perhaps influenced by the Constitution, followed by constitutional analysis only if an answer is not reached by interpretation alone. In Mulholland, a majority applied a threshold requirement of a pre-existing right to communicate before a law can burden the freedom. This requirement raises a number of issues, left to be resolved in future cases. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 141 I acknowledge that this conclusion of a collapsing of the two stages of the Lange test may appear to sit uneasily with the suggestion above that the pre-existing right requirement forestalls the analysis in the second step of that test. It may be that the majority's view of the nature of the implied freedom has led to the requirement of the pre-existing right, which must be satisfied as a step antecedent to the analysis of any impugned restriction in accordance with this notion of being a relevant burden rather than being any mere restriction on communication.
